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• U.S. export control and technology transfer policy and requirements do not 
serve U.S. interests. 
• This was recognized in the 2009 White House announcement of an initiative 
to change the export control regime, and in the Quadrennial Defense Review.
• The UK has had critical experience with these requirements in connection 
with the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program.
• The issue of UK access to JSF source codes was resolved at the Bush-Blair 
level in 2006, but re-opened in 2009 by the U.S.
• The UK will undertake a Strategic Defence Review, which will likely include 
an evaluation of the benefits of participating in U.S.-led defence projects.
• Analysis of UK views and experiences can indicate the extent to which U.S. 
policy discourages countries from joining U.S.-led multinational projects.
Recognizing the Problem – Quoting the QDR
• “Today's export control system is a relic of the Cold 
War and must be adapted to address current threats.  
The current system impedes cooperation, technology 
sharing, and interoperability with allies and partners.”
• “The U.S. export system itself poses a potential 
national security risk.”
• “These deficiencies can be solved only through 
fundamental reform.  The President has therefore 
directed a comprehensive review tasked with 
identifying reforms to enhance U.S. national security, 
foreign policy, and economic security interests.”
Déjà vu All Over Again
• UK got access to JSF source codes in 2006.
• DOD announced in November 2009 that U.S. would not 
release source codes and “that includes everybody.”
• A reprogramming facility will be set up to develop JSF 
software and distribute upgrades.  Changes to the software 
will be integrated at that facility.
• UK replied that it “currently has the JSF data needed at this 
stage of the programme, and is confident that in future we 
will continue to receive the data needed to ensure that our 
requirements for operational sovereignty will be met.”
• House of Commons Defence Committee stated in 2010 “We 
also note that there still appear to be outstanding issues 
concerning technology transfer for the JSF, which are of key 
importance to the success of the programme." 
Timing is Everything 
• UK just held a general election.
• There will be a Strategic Defence Review.
• Last SDR was in 1998.
• MOD has generated numerous papers in 
preparation for the SDR.
• No project epitomizes the UK commitment to 
work with the U.S. more than the JSF.
• U.S. could not have picked a worse time to re-
open the source code issue with the UK.
Mutual Awareness
• The UK appreciates that the U.S. has every 
justification for protecting its cutting-edge military 
technology.  
• However, the U.S. may not appreciate the extent 
to which U.S. export control and technology 
transfer policies have generated disincentives 
among allies and partners to participate in a 
U.S.-led development programme. 
• The UK experience with the JSF will be the focus 
of research to determine the impact of U.S. policy 
and practice.
MOD “Green Paper” – U.S. and Europe
• For the UK, no relationship is “more important 
than with the U.S.”
• “The UK benefits greatly from bilateral co-operation in the nuclear, 
intelligence, science, technology and equipment fields.”
• Notable commentary on Europe.
• “The return of France to NATO's integrated military structures offers 
an opportunity for even greater cooperation with a key partner 
across a range of defence activity.”
• However, UK experience with A400M and other Euro-projects has 
not been completely satisfactory.
• But U.S. decisions, such as on the JSF, generate the view that the 
U.S. is a difficult partner.
• This strengthens those who support greater European cooperation.
“Green Paper” – Acquisition/Technology
• Considerable attention to defence acquisition.
• “There are operational, industrial and economic benefits from working 
with other countries on acquisition.  However such acquisition involves 
risks, constraints, and potential costs.  We must choose the right 
approach for each project.”
• More nuanced view on military technology.
• “We will need to develop a greater understanding of the requirement 
for technological edge in our systems and of the risks associated with 
losing it.  We will need to be more agile in exploiting new technologies 
in our own capabilities.  We need to recognise that the technology we 
require depends on the threat we face.”
Defence Strategy For Acquisition 
Reform– Current Status
• MOD spends £20 billion annually on goods and 
services.
• Around two-thirds of the total Defence Budget.
• £6 billion on equipment.
• £5 billion supporting equipment in service.
• The MOD reports that "nearly 90% of our equipment 
projects now deliver front-line needs to cost, and 
over 80% deliver them to time."  
Defence Strategy For Acquisition Reform 
– Future Challenges
• Plans for new equipment are too ambitious, and must be scaled down 
to match likely funding.
• Need to improve management of equipment projects.
• Key factors on international projects.
• “Deciding whether to acquire equipment in collaboration with other countries has 
crucial ramifications for its performance, cost and timescale.  It often has important 
implications for international Defence relationships more generally, and for the 
Government's wider foreign and security policies.  We need to make sure all these 
issues are properly weighed in reaching final acquisition decisions.”
• Need to “examine the scope for managing technology and innovation 
better so that we can provide and update defence equipment more 
quickly, and at a price we can afford.”
Global Strategic Trends
• Hegemonic dominance of U.S. will fade, but U.S. 
will remain pre-eminent.
• While most developed countries will minimise defence 
expenditures, the U.S. is likely to be the exception, "making by far 
the greatest commitment to defence, although its economic power 
and technological advantage is likely to become increasingly 
challenged.”
• Europe will develop more capabilities, which is 
not the same as sufficient capabilities.
• Requirements for defence acquisition programs 
will become more complicated.
Character of Conflict
• Around 2020, "the UK's strength in defence 
technology, along with many other Western 
nations (but probably excluding the U.S.), may 
have been surpassed by these emerging powers.”
• UK defence budgets will very likely be tight in this period.  
• “Investments now in technology could hedge against relative 
technology decline in UK defence.“
• U.S. is central for UK military planning.
• “It is extremely unlikely that the UK will conduct warfighting
without U.S. leadership, but in other operations the UK may be 
called upon to lead a non-U.S. coalition."
Bernard Gray Report
• On multinational programmes, “the potential 
economic benefits of acquiring equipment in this 
way are significant.”
• However, “The inherent difficulties in ensuring 
that all participants in any collaboration have their 
interests aligned is widely held to be at the root 
cause of many problems and, more generally, 
the view across the MoD and the wider defence
industry is that such problems are a 
characteristic of all collaborative projects to a 
greater or lesser extent.”
Haddon-Cave Report
• Focussed on loss of a NIMROD aircraft in 
Afghanistan in 2006.
• One key theme: the MOD must be an intelligent 
customer and not find itself at the mercy of 
industry and suppliers with whom the MOD are 
not able to properly engage.
• Two additional points related to JSF:
• The report emphasized the need to control the 
supply chain.
• Also emphasized the need to manage capabilities 
through-life.
UK Participation in JSF
• UK is the only Level 1 partner.
• It has provided $2 billion in the system design 
and development phase.
• UK selected the STOVL variant for its carriers.
• It will purchase 138 planes with 60 in the period 
2015-19.
• BAE Systems is the largest non-U.S. industrial 
participant in JSF.
U.S.-UK Defence Trade
• 99.8% of licenses applications are approved.
• 8,500 items totalling $14 billion.
• UK firms have bought 50 U.S. aerospace and 
defence firms since 2001. 
• U.S. defence firms having either set up operations 
in the UK or acquired firms.
• UK provides three-quarters of all foreign 
investment in the U.S. defence sector. 
• U.S. defence industries export $1 billion a year to 
the UK.
• UK exports to the U.S. are about $350 million.
Strong Defence Relationship
• Ten umbrella DOD-MOD MOUs.
• Over 100 exchange agreements
• 30 project agreements.  
• For the U.S., the UK is the largest 
collaborative relationship.  
• For the UK, the U.S. provides about 50% 
of the MOD's Defence Science and 
Technology Laboratory's projects.  
Source Code Dispute – Round 1
• House of Commons Defence Committee
• “It is vital that the UK gets all the information and access to 
technology it requires from the U.S. to have 'Sovereign 
Capability' -- the ability to maintain the Joint Strike Fighter 
aircraft and undertake future upgrades independently.”
• “If these assurances are not given, it is questionable whether 
the UK should continue its involvement in the programme.”
• Congress said the U.S. should share JSF 
technology with the UK.
• Blair-Bush agreement in May 2006, but 
dispute lingered until end of the year. 
Source Code Dispute  II –
Additional Complications
• The Administration wants to get rid of the F136 
second engine for the JSF.
• This is key to the UK, as it is a GE/Rolls Royce product.
• JSF cost increases from £37 to £62 million come 
at a bad time for the MOD budget.
• Speculation about whether only one aircraft carrier might be fully 
fitted out with F-35s.
• U.S.-UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty is 
still on hold.
• House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee noted that "We are 
disappointed that despite promises to do so, the U.S. Senate has
not yet ratified the UK-U.S. Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty." 
Not An Optimal Atmosphere
• House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee stressed in a 2010 report that 
the UK should continue to work closely 
with the U.S. 
• But "the UK needs to be less deferential 
and more willing to say no to the U.S. on 
those issues where the two countries 
interests and values diverge." 
Larger Implications
• Unprecedented U.S.-UK cooperation in intelligence, 
nuclear defence, and military deployments.
• UK has established it can bring value to the table (anti-
IED capabilities).
• Ultimately, the UK questions whether the U.S. values 
UK contributions.
• And if the U.S. cannot resolve technology issues with 
the UK, what lessons will other countries draw?
• Australia also has long-standing disputes with the U.S. on 
technology access.
Frustration Into Action?  
• European firms are “designing around”
ITAR regulations.
• If the differential is not great, European 
firms are opting for non-ITAR items.
• French White Paper cites the need for 
non-ITAR-controlled electronics 
components to avoid limitations on French 
freedom of action.
Centre for Transatlantic Relations Study
• "Virtually every interview we conducted highlighted 
U.S. defense trade controls as a 'barrier' 
significantly impeding Transatlantic cooperation..."   
• Four key concerns expressed to researchers.  
• Limits on operational sovereignty
• "The UK, one of our closest allies, as well as France and Italy,
expressed strong concerns about this issue."   
• Reliance on ITAR controlled systems generating 
risks of schedule delays and increases in costs. 
• Re-export restrictions. 
• The complications the regulations generate for 
multinational facilities. 
U.S. Policy Questions
• Does the U.S. intend to carry all future defence 
development costs by itself?
• Does the U.S. want international partners to 
share the costs?
• Does the U.S. believe other countries can bring 
valuable technology and expertise to 
multinational programmes?
• Can the U.S. defence industry rely solely on 
DOD contracts?
• How important is it for the U.S. to promote such 
cooperative efforts to promote interoperability of 
other military forces with U.S. forces?
U.S. Export Control and 
Technology Transfer Questions
• How does the U.S. assess the risk of 
technology leakage vs. the benefits of 
cooperation and shared costs?
• Are U.S. regulations excessively broad?
• Do the U.S. regulations fail to discriminate 
between high and low tech items?
Final Considerations
• U.S. export control and technology transfer 
policies and their implementation are a 
disincentive for countries to participate in U.S.-
led multinational projects.
• The UK experience with the JSF in particular 
indicates the frustration which is generated, and 
will be the subject of a research study.
• The UK experience may be valuable for the U.S. 
in seeking to address the difficult policy questions 
that it faces.
